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wani and Ray investigatcd the implications of
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reached these conclusions:  cannot be used to find a sensible optimal com-
modity tax structure under rationing.
- In a single-person economy, optimal policy
dictates that the rationed commodity bears the  * The more a society is concemed  out ine-
entire tax.  The implication for developing coun-  quality, the greater the tax should be on nonra-
tries using ihis model is that if the government  tioned commodities.
has a fixed budget to subsidize certain commodi-
ties, optimal policy will be to subsidize only the  Kakwani and Ray present an alternative (more
iationed commodities, such as food.  realistic) model of rationing that overcomes
some of the restrictive features of the previous
- In a many-person economy (which reflects  rationing model.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Commodity  taxes  play an important  role in resource  mobilisation  in
many  developing  countries  (see  Tanzi  (1987)].  The  predominance  of  indirect
taxes  in the overall  tax effort  in such  economies  reflects,  partly,  the
severe  political  constraints  that  exist  on direct  taxes. The  authorities
in  many  less  developed  economies  have  traditionally,  and  more  so in  recent
years,  also relied  heavily  on indirect  taxes  as the principal  tool for
securing  redistribution  Esee,  for example,  the recent  volume  edited  by
Newberj  and  Stern  (1987)].  The  commodity  tax  rate is,  hence,  a paraneter
of  considerable  policy  importance  in  a  developing  country.
The literature  on optimal  commodity  taxes dates back to Ramsey's
(1927)  seminal  contribution  which sought  to answer  the question  (p.47):
'if  a given  revenue  is to  be raised  by proportionate  taxes  on some  or all
uses  of income...  being  possibly  at  different  rates,  how  should  these  rates
be adjusted  in order that the decrement  of utility  may be a minimum?
Ramsey's  original  treatment  was  devoted  exclusively  to  the  efficiency  issue
and  ignored the equity/redistributive  aspects of  commodity  taxation.
Diamon4  and  Mirrlees  (1971)  introduced  optimal  taxation  in a many person
economy and  used  a  social welfare function approach  which allowed
examination  of the  equity  aspect  of indirect  taxation.
The 'efficiency'  aspect  of commodity  taxation  essentially  involves  the
government  raising  a pre-specified  amount  of aggregate  revenue  in the
'least  cost'  way  - i.e.  the  authorities  choose  a set  of commodity  tax  rates
that maximise social welfare,  expressed  as a  function  of  individual
welfaze/utility.  It is clear  that  the  solution,  namely,  the  optimal  tax
rates  would  depend  on:  (a)  society's  perception  of  individual.welfare,  and2
(b)  the  assumed form  for  consumer preferences,  namely, the  adopted
utility/demand  functional  forms. The  importance  of  assumptions  about  consumer
preferences  for optimal commodity  taxes is now widely accepted in the
literature  (see,  for  example,  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1980),  Ch.  12,  14)J. As
Ray (1986)  has,  recently,  shown  using  numerical  demand  estimates  for India,
optimal commodity  taxes are  extremely sensitive  to  departure  from the
linearity/separability  assumptions  of the Linear Expenditure  System (LES)
demand functional  form that is widely used in tax studies  (Atkinson  and
Stiglitz  (1972),  Harris  and  Mackinnon  (1978),  Deaton  (1975),  Ahmad  and Stern
(1984),  Deaton  and  Stern  (1986)].
Even setting  aside the question  of the wisdom  of using LES demand
estimates  in  view  of  the  well  known  incompatibility  of  the
linearity/separability  assumptions  with data (Deaton  (1974),  Ray (1985a)],
there is the issue of the relevance  of optimal  commodity  tax theory  to
developing  countries  because  of  its dependence  on the common  assumption
underlying  empirical  dernand  analysis,  namely,  that  given  his/her  budget  and
commodity  prices,  the  consumer  has  chosen  freely  the  quantities  that  he/she  is
observed  to have purchased. It is a matter  of common  observation  that the
assumption  of free choice  is unlikely  to be valid in reality.  There  are
various  reasons  why the quantities  consumed  may not be directly  under  the
control  of those  who consume  them.  The most obvious  example  is that of
necessities  like  Food,  which  are scarce  in relation  to damand  in  developing
countries,  and are  subject to rationing.  Since optimal commodity  tax
estimates are  crucially dependent on  the  calculated price/expenditure
elasticities,  and since the latter are  likely to be  sensitive  to the
introduction  of  quantity constraint,  the  formulation  of  the  standard
Ramsey-Diamond-Mirrlees  optimal  tax  problem  in  the  presence  of rationing  is  an
important  issue,  especially  in the case  of LDCs.  It is worth  noting  that
while  the  optimal  tax  literature,  especially  in  recent  years,  has3
oncentrated  on  the  link between  optimal tax tbeory and consumer
preferences,  no attention  bas  been  paid  to the  question  of the  robustness
of  optimal  commodity  taxes  to  the  presence  of  quantity  constraint  on  demand
viz.  rationing.  That  is  the  central  motivation  of  this  paper.
Not surprisingly,  some of the  earliest  studies  on consumer  demand
under  rationing  took  place  during  and  soon  after  the  Warl  (e.g.  Rothbarth
(1941),  Tobin  and  Houthakker  (1951)].  After  a period  of  relative  neglect
in the sixties  and early seventies,  there  has recently  been renewed
interest  in the subject  - e.g.  Pollak  (1969],  Howard  11977],  Weitzaan
(19771,  Neary and Roberts [1980],  Sab  11987].  The methodology  of
generating  rationed  demand  equations  rests  on the concept  of 'virtual
prices'  introduced  by Rothbarth  [1941]  and developed  recently  in the
elegant  analysis  of  Neary  and  Roberts  (19801  using  duality  and  expenditure
functions.  The 'virtual  price'  of the  rationed  coumodity  is defined  as
that  price  which,  in conjunction  with  actual  prices  of the  non-rationed
commodities  and  a  'virtual  income'  i.e.  with  the  consumer  compensated  for
the price  change,  will induce  him to choose  the  rationed  level  as the
result  of (i.e.  as if as)  free  choice. in  their  important  contribution,
Neary  and  Roberts  (19801  bave  shown  that  virtual  prices  must  exist,  that
the support  or virtual  prices  of unrationed  goods  coincide  with actual
prices,  and  that,  via  the  use  of  the  expenditure  function,  one  can  generate
a matching  system  of rationed  demand  equations  from  an unrationed  demand
systeo. It is,  however,  interesting  to note  that  in most  of the  recent
exercises  on rationed  demand  systems  (e.g.  Neary  and  Roberts  (19801]  Sah
[19871),  the  LES  has  been  chosen  as  an illustrative  example. This  is of
course,  not  without  reason,  since  LES  is  one  of  the  few  demand  systeas  that
1See  Tobin  (1952)  for  a  survey  of  these  early  studies.4
generate  an explicit  expression  for  virtual  price  and,  hence,  the  rationed
LA,S  is simple  to write  down  and  easy  to  estimate. A principal  finding  of
this  study,  however,  is that  the rationed  LES,  in the  context  of optimal
commodity  tax  theory,  has  some  strong  (and  absurd)  implications  that  should
rule  it  out  as  a  candidate  for  welfare  applications.
In  the  context  of the  present  exercise,  only  one  commodity  is  rationed
and  the  ramaining  are freely  chosen  items. It is important  to note  that,
because  of the 'complete  systems'  framework,  quantity  constraint  on one
item will have an  impact  on the demand levels  and price/expenditure
elasticities  of the  unrationed  items,  and  hence  on their  optimal  commodity
taxes. Section  2 investigates  the  structure  of optimal  comsodity  taxes  in
a single  person  economy  under rationing. The validity  of the result,
derived  therein,  in a many person  economy  is investigated  in Section  3,
using  the  most  general  Bergson-Samuelson  form  of social  welfare  function.
In  order  to get  some  stronger  results,  an additive  separable  social  welfare
function  of  Atkinson's (1970) type is  assumed in  Section 4  with
implications  for optimal  taxation  under  rationing  outlined.  The theory
developed  in the latter  section  is applied  in Section  5 to the familiar
case of the rationed  LES, to derive some restrictive  (indeed  absurd)
optimal  tax  recults  that  cast  serious  doubt  on the  rationing  framework  as
far  as  considered  in this  paper. Section  6 presents  an alternative  (and  a
more realistic)  model of rationing  where the rationed  commodity  can be
bought  up to the  quantity  of ration  in the  ration  shops  at a subsidised
price,  and  beyond  in the  open  market  at the  market  price. As this  section
demonstrates,  this  more  realistic rationing model  has  significant
implications  for optimal  tax theory  and helps to overcome  some of the
restrictive  features  of the  previous  rationing  model.  The  paper  ends on
the  concluding  note  of section  7.s
2.  SiNCLE  PnRSoN  CASK
Suppose  there  are  (nWl)  commodities  in  the  economy  and  one  of them  is
rationed.  Let  rationed  commodity  *e  q  and  denote  the  fixed  quantity  to  be
consumed  by 40 and  a  price  p  is  ch'rged  for  this  commodity.  Further,  let
q (q  , q ,...,q ) be the  vector  of n freely  chosen  goods  and p  =  (p  ,
p  _...,p ) be the  vector  of prices. Then,  the  indirect  utility  function
may  be  denoted  by
u  =  UNqo, pOp,  x)
where  x is  the  lump-sum  income  of  the  household.
The  optimal  tax  problem  under  rationing  involves  maximizing  u subject
to  the  government  revehue  constraint
n
R  =E  t.q + t  q  (2.1)
ti being  the tax rates.  (p  -t  )  for  i  =  0,1,2,...,n,  are the  producer
prices  which  are  assumed  to  be fixed  in  face  of  changes  in  the  pattern  of
demand.  Setting  up  the  Lagrangean
L  =  u  +  AR
and  differentiating  L  with  respect  to  po  and  pi  and  equating  deriiatives  to
zero,  the  first  order  conditions  may  be  written  as
(#)  I[(R)  =  )  l([da  )  (2.2)
where  j  varies  from  1  to  a.6
Using  Roy's  theorem,  it  can  be  shown  that
'  -qA  and  -q  A  (2.3)
where A - au  is the  marginal  utility  of income.
Let  us  write  the  Slutsky  equations
E+  q  (2.4)
and
s  =  4fi q  i  (2.51
where s*i  is  tIe  compensated  change  in  q  with  respect  to  p.;  i  and  j  vary
g1  1  1
from  1 to  n.
Since  s**  must  be symmetric,  (2.4)  will  imply  s  - 0 for  all  i which
means  that there  is zero substitution  possibility  into  or away from  the
rationed  commodity.  Then  differentiating  (2.1)  with respect  to p0 and p
0
yields
W  =°  +Eti  -L  (2.6)
0  n
and
= q  +  gt  '  (2.7)
respectively. Utilizing  the fact  that sio  =  0 for  all i and sij  =  sji,
(2.6)  and (2.7)  can  be  written  as7
* jo(1-#)  (2.8)
and
*  q  (148.-)  (2.9)
respectively,  where
*  0  hal'  (2.10)
°  p1 Pi  tbeing  the  marginal  propensity  to  spend,  e* i  and
-i  'iT°  (2.11)
7ii  being  the  compensated  price  elasticities  for  non-rationed  commodities.
Substituting  (2.3),  (2.8)  and (2.9)  into  (2.2)  leads  to . = 0  for  all
,  so  that
&iqti  0  °  (2.12)
for  j  a  1,  2,...,n.  The  only  solution  to (2.12)  occurs  when  °j  a  0  for  all
i  1,...,n;  i.e.  commodity  tax  rates  on non-rationed  goods  are  all  equal
to  zero,  so  that  rationed  good  bears  the  entire  tax.
In  the context  of developing  countries,  this  result  has an  important
policy  implication. If the government  has a fixed  budget  to subsidize
certain  commodities,  the optimai  policy  will be to subsidize  only the
rationed commodities (non-rationed  commodities should receive zero
subsidy).8
It should  be noted  however,  that  this  result  is such less  startling
than  it  appears. The  conventional  wisdom  in the  optimal  tax  structure  is
that  lump  sum taxes  are  preferable  to distortionary  coamodity  taxes.  In
the present  context,  tax  on the rationed  items  is like a lump  sum tax,
since  there  is  zero  substitution  possibility  into  or  away  from  the  rationed
item. It  is  hardly  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  rationed  item  bears  the
entire  tax.  Does this result  generalize  to the many person  case?  The
answer  is  provided  in  the  next  section.
3.  NM  PERSON  CASE  UNDER  GENERAL  WELFARE  FUNCTION
In a  many person  economy,  the government  is concerned  with the
maximization  of a soc.al  welfare  function.  We assume  that the social
welfare  function  is  of  the  Bergson-Samuelson  form  which  is  a function
w =  w(uI,  U2...  u  )
of the utilities  of the H  individuals. The optimal  taxation  problem
involves  choosing  ti (i  =  O.l...,n) to  maximize  V subject  to the  revenue
constraint
R  E  S  t,Qi  +  toHqo  (3.1)
where  i  S  qh  being  the  aggregate  demand  of  the  ith  commodity.
h  I
Using  the  Lagrangean framework, the  first  order  optimization
conditions  may  be
raw]  a  1  =[rawt@  1  (3.2)
FOJ  twiJ  lRJla19
where  J  varies  from  1  to  A.
Using  Roy's  identity
-0i~]  qosP  (3.3)
*j  -Ephqh  (3.4)
where  eV  O  u  is the social  marginal  utility  of income  of  the  hth
consumer  or  the  welfare  weight.
Differentiating  (3.1)  with  respect  to  po  and  pi  yields
i  S °ipi 91  + Hqo
and
Qj  +  iPi
which on substituting  into (3.2)  and using (3.3)  and (3.4)  give the
optimization  conditions  as
[  °  hal  ]  IQ  +  i'.g  iPi  tj!]  L  U, 0 tJ  [Rio  + i' oi  i  35
Let  us  assume that taxes on  all  non-rationed  commodities  are
proportional  to prices,  i.e. a  =  a for all j  =  1,2,...,n,  then (3.5)
simplifies  to10
[q  b  l  °[Qj  + &i'.Pi  ti]tlS  U  #'i][Rio  +  s  oit]  36
The  budget  constraint  for  all  consumers  may be  written  as
n
X  S  P.  Q.  + UP  q
H
where  X  =  x  xh  is  the  total  income  of  all  consumsrs.  Differentiating  this
ht
equation  with  respect  to  p0 and  p  yields
Eq  +  EP,
and
Qj + iSlpi w  9-
which  on  substituting  into  (3.6)  leads  to
)q  Qi  fLs,  E  Hqi (1-3)  q]  (37)
when  O  are  all  not  equal,  (3.7)  will  hold  true  only  if o  *  1,  which
means  that  all  non-rationed  comodities  must  be  taxed  at  infinite  rate.,  In
the  case  of a  single  person  economy,  the  optimus  tax  policy  implied  zero
taxes  on  all  non-rationed  co  modities.  Thus,  the  single  person  result  does
not  generalize  to  the  many  person  case.
2This  follows  from  the  fact  that  °i  =  _ti  -pi  being  the  producer  price  so
Pi+ti
that  ei  = 1.0  will  hold  true  only  if  ti  approaches  infinity  (in  view  of  the
fact  that  pi  # 0  for  all  i).11
The  above  conclusions  may change,  however  if we do not impose  the
restriction  that  taxes  on all  non-rationed  commodities  are  proportional  to
prices. in order  to get  stronger  results  it would  be necessary  to  make
some  assumptions  about  the  social  welfare  function.  This  is  considered  in
the  next  section.
4. A  SPECIFIC  SOCIAL  VELFARE  FUNCTION
Ve assume  that  all  consumers  have  identical  tastes  and  differ  only  in
income. 3 The preferences  are given  by the indirect  utility  function
u(q  ,  pO  ,  p,  x). The  government  maximizes  the  social  welfare  function
1  .c  I  ec T  =  i  J  f  u  f(x)dx  (4.1)
where  a is the minimum  income,  f(x)  the probability  density  function
describing  the  distribution  of total  expenditure  and  c  is  a  measure  of the
government's  aversion  to inequality.  If c  is  zero,  the  social  welfare  is
given  by  the  mean  utility  level.  As c  approaches  infinity,  social  welfare
is sensitive  only  to  the  utility  of the  poorest  consumer  in the  economy.
Note  that  Atkinson's  (1970)  welfare  function  is  defined  over  money  incomes
whereas  here  we  use  the  utility  function  (see  Deaton  1977).
The government's  revenue  constraint  as given  in (3.1)  can also  be
written  as
R  =  s'E(q  )+ t  qO  (4.2)
je  0  0
3The differences  due to size and composition  of households  to which
consumers  belong  can  be  taken  into  account  under  this  framework  by  means  of
consumer  unit scales  (see for instance  Deaton  and Muellbauer  (1980),
Muellbauer  (1974,  1980),  Kakwani  (1977,  1980)  and  more  recently  Ray  (1985).12
where E(qi) is the  mathematical  expectation  of qi 4.
Using Roy's theorem,  it can be shown  that
ap  =  -q E(ueX)  (4.3)
and
aw  =-E(ueqjX)  (4.4)
where  X  =  au  is the  marginal utility  of income  as defined in (2.3). ax
Utilizing  Slutsky's  equation it  can be shown that
3p  = q0[-E(o)I  (4.5)
and
a  =  E[qj(l+6  _4)]  (4.6)
.1j  j 
where  0 and 6j  are defined in (2.10)  and (2.11),  respectively.
Substituting  (4.3),  (4.4),  (4.5)  and  (4.6)  into  the  first-order
conditions  (3.2)  yields
E[qj(1+6j-0)]  =  T.E(qj)[1-E(0)1  (4.7)
where
E(u6X.
T.  = -
J  E(u  cX)E(qj)
It can  be seen that  when  aj =  a  for  all j =  1, 2,...,n,  (4.7)  will hold
true  only if  aj = 1  for  all j,  which confirms  our earlier  result that
4The  expectation  is evaluated  over the  probability  distribution  of the total
consumer  expenditure.  This formulation  uses the  assumption  that the demand
function  is the same for all consumers.13
all non-rationed  goods in the many person  case must be taxed at infinite
rates.
Let  us write
E(qj6j)  =  E(qjkj)  + ajE(qjn*.)  (4.8)
where  E(qjkj)  is the  average  compensated  change  in the  demand  for  good j  as a
result  of imposing  taxes on goods other than j.  (4.8),  thus gives us a
measure  of the substitutability  of good j.  Substituting  (4.8)  into (4.7)
gives
a.  =  -*  ((l-T.)E(qj)(1-E(C)]  +  [E(qj)E(,)  - E(q.$)J  +  E(q.k.)]  (4.9)
E(qjn*j) 
Since  X  is the marginal  utility  of income,  it must be a decreasing
function  of income  and  e  >  0  implies  that  u E  decreases  with x, so that
E(u  x)  and qj  will  be negatively  correlated  which  would  mean
E(u Xqj)  <  E(u  £X)E(q;)
which  implies  that  T. <  1 for  all  j.  Also  as  c  increases,  the  magnitude  of
-e
correlation  between  u  X  and qj increases,  so that (1-T)  will be an
increasing  function  of  E  *  Since  the first  term in the righthand  side of
(4.9)  is positive, ai  will  be an increasing  function  of  e  ,  i.e.  the  more  a
society  is concerned  about inequality,  the greater  will be the tax on the
non-rationed  commodity.
Further,  if commodity  j  is  an absolutely  inelastic  commodity  in  the  sense
that  its  consumption  is  completely  insensitive  to changes  in income,14
then  T. =  1 and  E(q.Q)  = E(q.)E(Q)  which  imply  that  the first  two  terms  in
i  1  )
the righthand  side of (4.9)  will be zero.  This means  that the tax on
commodity  j  will  depend  on the  third  term.  If in addition  commodity  j  is
of  limited  substitutability,  it  will  attract  zero  tax  rate.
The  substitution  term  E(q.k.)  is  likely  to  be  positive  for  necessities
and negative  for luxuries  and, therefore,  this term will dictate  that
necessities  should  attract  higher  tax  rates. But  this  effect  can  be  offset
by the first  term  which  implies  lower  tax rates  on necessities. If the
social  welfare  function  is highly  egalitarian,  i.e.  f  is high,  the first
term  in (4.9)  will  dominate  the  third  term. The  policy  implication  of  this
is  that  the  government  will  tax  luxury  goods  more  heavily  than  necessities.
Thus,  the  major  conclusion  emerging  from  this  section  is that  tax  rates  on
non-rationed  commodities  should  not be uniformly  proportional  to prices.
If, however,  the restriction  of uniformity  is imposed,  then the optimum
policy  will  be to tax  all  non-rationed  commodities  at infinite  rate  which
in  our  view  is  not  a feasible  solution.
5. LINEAR  EXPENDITURE  SYSTEM
The  demand  functions  under  rationing  for  the  linear  expenditure  system
is  given  by (Neary  and  Roberts  1980):
qi  =  t+[.P  IPLi7.i  POqO  ]  (5.1)
where i is the  subsistence  consumption  of the  ith  commodity  and 5  is its
marginal  budget  share  so  that15
n
£ Bi '.  (5.2)





6. =  ii  (4-a.)  (5.3)
~~~~~~~~~~.3
n  o
where  $  =  E  M.
i=i  (1-B  0 ) 
When the Engel curves  are linear, *  in (2.10)  will be non-stochastic
which  simplifies  (4.7)  to
E(qj6j)  = -E(qj)  (1-s)(1-T.)
which  in  view  of (5.3)  becomes
a.  +  (5*4)
E()()qj-yj)
Substituting  the  demand  function  (5.1)  into  (5.4)  leads  to
*  (l-+)E(u  X( 1z-x)]
3  ~~~~n
E(u  'X)(u-  i£piyi- Poqo
i=  t
where  uL  =  E(z),  the  mean total  expenditure.  This  equation  demonstrates16
that  *  is  same  for  all  j, i.e.  the  taxes  on  non-rationed  commodities  must
be uniformly  proportional.  Thus, it follows  from  the previous  sections
that  the  non-rationed  comodities  must  be taxed  at infinite  rate.  This  is
an important  finding. It demonstrates  that  the  linear  expenditure  systea
cannot  be used to find  a sensible  optimal  commodity  tax structure  under
rationing.
6.  AN  ALTERNATIVE  MODEL  OF RATIONING
We now consider  an alternative  model of rationing  in which the
government  provides  a fixed asount  of one commodity,  say, food at a
subs.  ized  price.  Suppose  there  are n commodities  q ,  q  ... ,q  in the 2'  n
economy  and q  is the amount of  the first commodity  provided  at a
subsidized  price p.  If p  =  (p  ,  p ,  ,p  ) is the vector  of market
I  2  n
prices,  the  consumer  maximizes  his  or her  utility  function
u  =  u(qi  2"n...,q  (6.1)
subject  to  the  budget  constraint
x=P  i  (q-q)P  + p2q2  +...pqn  (6.2)
Note  that  if q  >  q ,  the  consumer  satisfies  his  or her  excess  demand
of the  first  commodity  over  q  by  buying  it  at  the  prevailing  market  price.
Thus,  there  is  a  dual  market  for  the  first  commodity.
It can be seen that the above model is equivalent  to the usual
consumer  demand  model  when the  consumer  has been  given  a cash  subsidy  of17
(p  -p  )q 5  Thus,  the  demand  equation  of the  ith  commodity  will  be given
by
q.  q (p.  x +  (P-i)q)  (6.3)
Note  that  if p  is fixed,  this  demand  equation  is not  a homogenous
function  of  degree  zero  in  prices  p  and  incose  x.
Substituting  (6.3)  into  (6.1)  yields  the  indirect  utility  function  of
the  consumer  with  income  x as
u  - ulp,  x  +  (P  -p  )q  (6.4)
which  on differentiating  with  respect  to p  and  p. and  using  the  Roy's
identity




Note  that  0  0  if  q  q  which  means  that  the  consumers  who  do  not
buy  the  rationed  commodity  at the  market  price  are  not  adversely  affected
by  the  increase  in  the  market  price  of  that  good.
The  optimal  problem  now  involves  determining  tax  rates  t ,  t ...  ,t
so  that  consumer's  indirect  utility  function  (6.4)  is  maximized  subject  to
the  government's  revenue  constraint
sIt is assumed  that the ration  quota  is always  less than the actual
requirement  of  that  commodity.18
n
R  Z  tiqi  - (p1- )q 1 (6.7)
jul
which is based on the assumption  that the government  buys the rationed
commodity  at the producer's  price  and sells  it to the consumer  at a lower
price  of  pi.  6
Using  the  Slursky  equation  and  the  demand  equation  (6.3),  it  can  be shown
that
ap  q  =qI(l+61-  - q,  (6.8)
and
aR  =  qj(1+^j_+)  (6.9)
where 0.  and  6. are  defined  in  (2.10)  and  (2.11),  respectively.
Substituting  (6.5), (6.6), (6.8) and  (6.9) into the  first order
optimization  condition  for  a single  person  we obtain
ql ql)  =  j =-ql+  qlll  (6.10)
Suppose  that all texes are uniformly  proportional,  i.e.  vi =  a  for all
i  which  will  imply Si  and  8. equal  to  zero  for  all  j  = 2,...,n.  Under  these
conditions  (6.10)  will  be satisfied  only  if  q, - 0,  i.e.  when  no commodity
is subsidized.  Thus,  when  a fixed  quantity  of any  commodity  is  provided  at  a
subsidized  price,  the  optimum  tax  policy  dictates'that  we do not have  all
uniformly  proportional  taxes.
6Note  that  the  government  collects  revenue  on  the  first  commodity  only  on the
amount  bought  in  the  open  market,  i.e.  tqj-ql).19
Equation  (6.10)  can  also  be  written  as
c,=  ql  ql'l  +  vl0l1lx  - (ql--ql  )  kj  6.1
aj  =  (ql 1I1n*  - (6.11)
where  kj is  the  compensated  proportional  change  in  the  demand  for  the  jth  good
as a result  of imposing  taxes  on goods  other  than  j.  k. is likely  to be
positive  for necessities  and negative  luxury  goods.  It can be seen from
(6.11)  that a.  will  be  higher  if  the  ith  commodity  is  a  necessity.  Further,
the  magnitude  of  e.  is inversely  proportional  to the  compensated  own  price
elasticity.  However,  the most interesting  finding is that  1.  is a
decreasing  function  of kl, an implication  of which  is that if the  rationed
cemmodity  is a necessity,  the taxes  on non-rationed  item is generally  a
necessity  and therefore,  should  attract  greater  tax than the non-rationed
item.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have investigated  the implications  of the optimal
commodity  taxation  in the presence  of rationing.  The analytical  results
presented  in the paper raise the fundamental  issue  of  the relevance  and
usefulness  of  the standard  optimal commodity  tax results in evaluating
existing  indirect  taxes  and providing  policy  advice. Following  are some  of
the  implications  for  tax  policies  that  emerge  from  this  analysis.
1.  In the  presence  of a single  person  economy  the  optimal  policy  dictates
that the rationed  commodity  bears  the  entire  tax.  In the context  of
developing  countries,  this  result  implies  that  if the  government  has a
fixed  budget  to  subsidize  certain  commodities,  the  optimal  policy  will20
be  to  subsidize only  the  rationed commodities (non-rationed
commodities  should  receive  zero  subsidy).
2.  The  single  person  result  of zero  tax  on  non-rationed  commodities  does
not  generalize  to  the  many  person  case. In the  many  person  case  if  we
impose  the  restriction  that  taxes  on all  non-rationed  comsodities  are
proportional  to prices,  the  optimal  policy  will  tax all  non-rationed
commodities  at infinite  rate.
3.  The  linear  expenditure  system  always  results  in  uniformly  proportional
taxes  on non-rationed  comaodities.  It follows  that the  non-rationed
commoiities  must always  be taxed  at infinite  rate.  Thus, the LES
cannot  be used to find a sensible  optimal  commodity  tax structure
under rationing. The linearity/separability  assumptions  of LES are
already  known  to have  some restrictive  implications  for optimal  tax
theory  in the standard  formulation. We have extended  them to the
rationed  case.
4.  The tax  on a non-rationed  commodity  should  be an increasing  function
of the inequality  aversion  parameter,  i.e. the more a society  is
concerned  about inequality,  the greater will be the tax on  the
non-rationed  commodity.
5.  When a fixed  quantity  of any commodity  is provided  at a subsidized
price, the optimal tax policy  dictates  that we do not have all
uniformly  proportional  taxes. This  result  differs  from  the  standard
optimal  commodity  tax result  which states  that all taxes  should  be
uniformly  proportional  for  the  single  consumer  economy.21
A useful  extension  of this study  and one that we hope to carry  out in
further  work would  be the  empirical  calculation  of optimal  commodity  taxes  in
the  presence  of rationing  and  within  the  framework  of a nonlinear  (and,  hence,
more realistic)  demand  model.  It is  worth  noting  that  while  a good deal can
be said  a priori  about  optimal  commodity  taxes if preferences  are separable,
very little  can be asserted  if they are not.  As Ray (1986)'s  results  have
shown,  optimal  commodity  taxes  under  realistic  demand  systems  bear  very little
resemblance  to LES-based  tax  rates,  especially  from  the  viewpoint  of an equity
conscious  planner.  As we have shown  in this paper,  the situation  gets more
comrlUcated  even for the restrictive  rationed  LES.  Empirical  calculation  of
optimal commodity taxes  under  rationed nonlinear demand  systems, while
requiring  complex  and expensive  estimation  proceedings,  would be a valuable
contribution to  the  optimal  tax  literature, especially in  developing
countries.22
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